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Abstract The perception of high crime rates in downtowns has hindered
the revitalization of downtown shopping districts and adjacent
residential areas. This paper presents a better methodology for
measuring crime in commercial shopping districts, replacing the
conventional method of quoting crimes per 100,000 residences
with a measure that more accurately reﬂects one’s chance for
being a crime victim. This new measurement is used to address
the question of whether the downtown shopping districts of Los
Angeles and San Diego are as dangerous as two of their most
competitive suburban shopping areas—Santa Monica and
Fashion Valley. The ﬁndings indicate that actual crime rates in
both downtown Los Angeles and downtown San Diego are in
fact lower that those of their suburban counterparts.
Introduction
Shopping districts have historically anchored the core of downtown business
districts. Since World War II, shopping in the United States has slowly but steadily
migrated to suburban shopping malls. Flagship stores in downtown locations have
gradually closed leaving in their wake downtown shopping districts struggling to
attract shoppers back downtown from the suburbs.
The long-term shift of retail activity from downtowns to suburban shopping malls
has been addressed in numerous studies about retail investment and urban growth
(e.g., for example, DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1996). These authors point to a
number of factors that have contributed to downtown decline including trafﬁc
congestion, interstate highway development, government housing programs such
as FHA, suburban housing, retail, ofﬁce, and industrial development, and ongoing
decentralization of jobs and housing. In addition, to these forces ‘pulling’ jobs
and shopping out of downtown, they note ‘push factors’ including crime, poor
public schools, and growing concentrations of minority and immigrant populations
around downtowns. Shifts in shopping behavior from transit-oriented downtown
department stores and main street shops to car-oriented regional shopping malls578  Peiser and Xiong
and big-box warehouse stores have also eroded the downtown shopping customer
base over time.
There are many signs that downtowns are coming back, but their role today is
very different from what it was ﬁfty years ago. Rather than being focal points for
jobs and regional shopping, downtowns are coming back as cultural centers with
signiﬁcant numbers of residences and shopping that is often entertainment-
oriented and must compete successfully with suburban counterparts. During the
last decade, downtown shopping districts have been transformed in many cities to
cater to new types of shoppers—tourists, immigrants and ofﬁce workers. Many
cities have built shiny new malls in downtowns trying to lure suburban shoppers
back downtown.
Great efforts have been made not only to reduce crime in downtown shopping
districts but also to advertise urban regeneration efforts and bring people back
from suburban shopping malls to shop downtown. As one of the important factors
contributing to downtown decline and the persisting reluctance of shoppers to
return downtown, this paper focuses on fear of crime. Previous studies have shown
that perceptions of crime are slow to die and affect people’s shopping behavior
and other location decisions long after the situation on the ground has changed.
This study asks the simple question: Is shoppers’perception of crime in downtown
versus suburban shopping districts accurate? If not, how can downtown advocates
overcome this misperception and help revitalize downtown retailing, assuming that
they can overcome other problems retarding downtown recovery.1
The approach in this study is to measure the incidence of being the victim of a
crime in two major metropolitan areas—Los Angeles and San Diego. The
likelihood of victimization in the downtown shopping cores is compared with a
major suburban competitor in each city. Shopping districts were deliberately
chosen in high income areas for comparison—Santa Monica, a suburb of Los
Angeles, and Fashion Valley, a suburb of San Diego. If downtown shopping
centers are going to succeed, they must be competitive with the most attractive of
their suburban counterparts.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that victimization rates are normally
measured by dividing the number of crimes by the number of residents in an area.
This approach may work for comparing crime rates for residents across cities and
suburbs, but it does not work for business districts that have low permanent
residential populations but high daytime worker and nighttime visitor populations.
The major problem of comparing crime rates, therefore, is how to measure the
number of people subject to crime in a given geographic area. Surprisingly, the
literature on crime rates in business districts is sparse, and other researchers’
solutions for dealing with this measurement problem are not readily available.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, a more accurate
methodology for measuring crime in commercial shopping districts is developed,
which replaces the conventional method of quoting crimes per 100,000 residents.Crime and Town Centers  579
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An attempt is made to measure the actual likelihood that an individual will be a
crime victim based on the total number of people who frequent the shopping
district—a number that includes shoppers, ofﬁce workers, residents and tourists.
Secondly, this new measurement is used to address the question of whether the
downtowns of two major cities, Los Angeles and San Diego, are as dangerous as
two of their most competitive suburban shopping areas.
Reported crime rates inﬂuence people’s perceptions of crime. To preview the
conclusions, by properly estimating one’s likelihood of being a crime victim in
shopping centers and business districts, the ﬁndings demonstrate that downtown
Los Angeles and San Diego have much lower crime rates than conventional
measures would indicate. By comparing the rates with two of their wealthier
suburbs, Santa Monica and Fashion Valley, the study shows that the central city
downtowns are in fact safer than their suburban counterparts. The study builds on
two principles established separately in the crime literature and real estate
literature. In the crime literature, victimization rates should properly account for
the number of potential victims, and in the real estate literature, fear of crime
hurts real estate values and inhibits investment. By showing that perceptions of
crime in downtown are no longer accurate, the paper provides evidence to mitigate
fear of crime as a factor affecting downtown revitalization.
The sample for this conclusion is small—two downtowns and two suburban
centers. It would of course be desirable to compare many cities and many suburban
shopping districts. The focus is on two metropolitan areas because proper analysis
requires block-by-block tabulation of both crimes and people. Further study of
other cities is needed to generalize the results. However, the results are of interest
and lend support to the notion that downtowns are not as dangerous as many
people believe.
These ﬁndings, if borne out by other similar studies, are important for the long-
term health of downtown areas and for bringing some of the most important
customers—those who ﬂed to the high income suburban shopping centers—back
to downtown. The ﬁndings also offer hope for drawing more residents to live in
downtown and surrounding neighborhoods, as well as encouraging investors to
ﬁnance their new homes and shopping centers.
Background and Literature Review
This paper combines several different strands of literature that are important to
understanding the relationship between crime, shopping behavior and downtown
revitalization. The major strands include fear of crime versus actual crime,
victimization, the relationship of crime to property values and to location
decisions, shopping mall safety and crime rate measurement.
While crime is but one of a number of factors affecting the recovery of downtown
shopping, perceptions of crime linger long after an area has become safer.
Perception of crime versus actual crime is addressed directly in a recent paper by580  Peiser and Xiong
Myers and Chung (1998). They ﬁnd that prior victimization explains some of the
rather enormous perception of future victimization, but a sizable gap between
perceived risk and actual risk remains. In communities where there is widespread
knowledge of the victimizations or of the victims, perception of the risks of
victimization may be inﬂated. Such factors as racial composition of the
neighborhood and neighborhood instability often show larger independent impacts
on fears or perceptions of crime than do actual victimization experiences. Another
paper by Dominitz and Manski (1997) uses the Survey of Economic Expectations.
One of their ﬁndings is that respondents substantially over-predict the risk of
burglary.
Similarly, a paper based on the 1993 Minnesota Crime Survey (Minnesota
Planning, 1994) ﬁnds that the percentage of respondents who believe they are
likely to be victims of violent crime in the next year is much higher than the
percentage reporting they had been victims in 1992. The relative risk of becoming
a crime victim (or the level of fear) depends on one’s age and gender, where one
lives, with whom they associate and what they do to protect themselves. The
results revealed substantial disparities in fear of crime versus actual victimization
experiences. While 44.5% of respondents feared walking alone at night within a
mile of their homes and 21% expected to be threatened or attacked in the coming
year, only 4% had actually been attacked in 1992. The current paper extends the
work of Dominitz and Manski (1997), Myers and Chung (1998) and the Minnesota
Crime Survey (1994) by computing victimization rates using a new methodology.
The current study investigates how actual crime risk, using new methodology,
compares to perceived crime risk as measured by computations using the
conventional methodology. To the extent that fear of crime is inﬂuenced by
reported crime rates, these papers support the thesis that the likelihood of being
a crime victim may be overstated in business areas with high daytime populations,
which are not taken into account under conventional reporting methodology. To
the extent that perceptions of high crime linger long after actual crime has been
reduced, the effects of misleading reported crime rates may inhibit real estate
investment and revitalization for longer periods than is necessary.
Fear of crime is closely related to signs of community disorganization and decay
(Meithe, 1995). For example, litter on streets, vandalism, run-down buildings, or
few neighborhood communication networks increase individual’s perceived risks
of criminal victimization and their subsequent fear of crime. Fear of crime also
inﬂuences when people work and shop. Hamermesh (1999) looks at the time of
crime. He explains why there is a lower propensity to work evenings in large U.S.
metropolitan areas. He ﬁnds signiﬁcant impacts of inter-area differences in
homicide rates on work timing—higher homicide rates deter working in the
evening and at night and shift it to the daytime. He relies on evidence presented
by Skogan (1990) that expressed fear of crime is highly positively correlated cross-
sectionally with actual crime rates. He argues that the magnitude of fear of crime
depends in large part on how it is measured. Fear of crime is a multiplicative
function of both perceived risk and the perceived seriousness of the offense.Crime and Town Centers  581
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Skogan describes the relationship between crime-related experiences and fear of
crime as being complex and inconsistent across studies. He ﬁnds that the empirical
evidence on the impact of measures of neighborhood incivilities on individual’s
fear of crime is inconclusive.
The present paper builds on the work of these studies by examining the
relationship between actual crime rates in areas of perceived higher risk—namely,
downtowns—as compared to their suburban counterparts. While providing support
for the disconnect between fear of crime and actual crime, the paper also focuses
on how poor measurement of crime may feed continuing perceptions of high
crime, especially in non-residential areas where traditional measures do not
accurately portray one’s risk of being a victim of crime.
While downtown business districts are anchored by ofﬁce buildings, many
suburban business districts are anchored by shopping malls. There is a growing
literature on the subject of crime and shopping malls. Phillips and Cochrane
(1988) dispel some popular myths that shopping centers have high levels of crime
and violence. The introduction of accurate recording of incidents showed that
incidents of nuisance, not crime, were the predominant problem and these
incidents stemmed from a conﬂict of interest between shoppers, retailers and the
young people who were using the centers as meeting places.
In an article four years later, Nazel (1992:28) notes a growing concern among
developers that malls are not as safe as they used to be. Developers of projects
in larger markets are reporting much more serious incidents, including increases
in car theft and vandalism, drug dealers organizing transactions, warring gangs
strolling the malls and more violent attacks on customers. Nazel remarks, ‘‘In a
sense, the mall is now a street, with a great deal of pedestrian trafﬁc. It’s a natural
target for pickpockets and professional thieves who live off heavy trafﬁc.’’
Concerns about mall safety have led to sharply higher budgets for security. Front-
page reports of shootings in a mall or gang activity can hurt sales there for years.
Ironically, perceptions that suburban malls are not as safe as they used to be may
help downtown shopping areas enjoy a renaissance. In another relevant article,
DiLonardo (1997) looks at the ﬁnancial implications of retail crime prevention.
The present article adds to the literature on crime and shopping malls by carefully
measuring the differences in crime rates between downtown malls and the prime
alternative suburban shopping destinations.
The issue of crime in shopping malls is part of a broader literature on crime and
place, and crime prevention through environmental design. For a general
background on this topic, see Jeffrey (1971), Newman (1972), Poyner and Webb
(1991), Clarke (1992), Felson (1995, 1998), Rengert (1996), and Felson and
Clarke (1997, 1998). Eck (1997) examines 99 interventions in 78 studies of crime
having to do with crime at places. He provides an excellent overview of the types
of crimes in different places including apartments and residences, retail stores,
banks and money-handling places, public transportation, parking lots and garages,
open public spaces and public coin machines.582  Peiser and Xiong
Another relevant strand of literature focuses on the relationship between location
decisions, crime and property values. Segelhorst and Brady (1984) analyze the
effect of fear of crime on location decisions of urban-suburban residents. They
focus on the existence of fear as an ‘undepletable detrimental externality’ that
promotes the movement of people from central cities to suburbs. They ﬁnd that
this fear generates a suburban incentive to discriminate against minorities to
prevent the spread of violent street crime to the suburbs. Thaler (1978) also
discusses crime and property values. He develops a hedonic model with property
values as the dependent variable to determine how much people are willing to
pay to live in a neighborhood with a low crime rate. The results indicate that
crime has a statistically signiﬁcant negative impact on property values. These two
papers provide evidence concerning how crime affects location decisions. They
motivate the present paper by establishing a connection between fear of crime and
people’s buying decisions, especially with respect to decision of shoppers to shop
in downtown versus the suburbs. To the extent that crime reduces property values,
it affects investor decisions on where to invest in new shopping centers.
Lastly, the present paper addresses the issue of crime rates and how these rates
are reported. Engstad (1975) compared the number of auto crimes and bar crimes
(assault, disorderly conduct and violations of the liquor act) in small areas with
hotels to the same crime counts in adjacent areas without hotels. He standardized
the crime counts by the number of residents living in the areas and found an
association between the presence of hotels and higher rates of crime per thousand
people. Bueger, Cohn and Petrosino (1995: 249) discuss the nature of boundaries
in dealing with whether to count police presence just outside the boundary of a
public place. The surveyors applied the ‘‘If I were a mugger’’ rule: ‘‘If I were a
mugger, would I be deterred from mugging someone here and now because of
the presence of the police at the particular location?’’ If the answer were ‘‘yes,’’
the observer was to record that ofﬁcers were present in the hot spot even if they
were physically outside the boundaries. These papers help provide an
understanding of recording crime incidents—the numerator—for purposes of
computing victimization rates.
Articles that address the choice of denominators for standardizing crime counts
are sparse. One exception is Eck and Weisburd’s article (1995:10) in which they
discuss Engstad’s (1975) use of different denominators for auto and bar crimes.
In his examination of crime near hotels, Engstad standardized crime counts in
each hotel area by the number of parking places and by the number of bar seats
in each area. He found that one particular hotel area had higher auto and bar crime
rates than the other hotel areas. Another paper by Balkin and McDonald (1981)
addresses the time that people are exposed to criminals. Their model distinguishes
the ‘‘real’’ crime rate (the probability of being a victim per unit of exposure time)
from the ‘‘nominal’’ crime rate (the number of crimes per capita). They note that
the nominal crime rate can be inversely related to the real crime rate. More
accurate reporting and accounting of crime is important if fear of crime is to beCrime and Town Centers  583
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reduced in areas such as business districts where conventional reporting may
overstate actual victimization rates.
Taken together, the literature has a number of strands that are important to the
present paper. Most of these articles are written from the perspective of
criminology or sociology. This paper adds to this literature from a real estate
perspective. By comparing downtown shopping center crime to that in suburban
centers, this paper takes advantage of the several strands of literature noted above
to evaluate the actual crime rates for competing shopping destinations.
 Methodology
To address the question of whether downtown shopping centers have higher crime
rates than suburban shopping centers, the likelihood of becoming a victim in the
downtown shopping districts was compared with that in the suburban shopping
district. Two metropolitan areas, Los Angeles and San Diego were selected for
this research. For each city, a major high-end suburban shopping center was also
selected—Santa Monica’s Third Street Promenade near the ocean, twelve miles
west of downtown Los Angeles, and the Fashion Valley area, approximately eight
miles northwest of downtown San Diego (see Exhibits 1 and 2). A high-end
shopping area in each metropolitan area was selected for comparison purposes
because well-to-do shoppers are the ‘bread and butter’ of shopping centers. It is
their preference for suburban shopping malls that has motivated most major
department stores to leave downtown areas. Successful suburban shopping centers
in Santa Monica and Fashion Valley represent major competitive alternatives to
downtown shopping areas in downtown Los Angeles and San Diego. While
shoppers are drawn to suburban shopping malls for many reasons besides fear of
crime downtown, by comparing downtown crime rates with those in the
competitive suburban shopping nodes, insight can be gained into how far
downtowns have to go with respect to crime to draw back the most favored group
of shoppers. Presumably, if crime rates are such that shoppers who frequent the
most upscale shopping centers can be drawn back downtown, then less well-to-
do shoppers in other parts of town will be even more likely to do so.2
The actual crime occurrence can be measured by dividing the total annual Part I
reported crimes to the total exposed population. Part I crimes, shown in the
Appendix, include major crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, arson and burglary.
The result gives the victimization rate3—the likelihood that one will become a
crime target. The lower the victimization rate, the safer the place.
The numerator in the function is the annual aggregated Part I reported crimes for
the target area.4 The denominator is the total population exposed to crime in the
target area. This includes anyone who would have some likelihood of being
present in the area, including residents, employees, shoppers and visitors. Each
group is aggregated on an annual basis.584  Peiser and Xiong
Exhibit 1  Downtown Los Angeles & Santa Monica Third Street Promenade
Downtown Los Angeles
Santa Monica Third Street Crime and Town Centers  585
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Exhibit 2  San Diego Downtown and Fashion Valley
Fashion Valley  
Downtown San Diego586  Peiser and Xiong








 Total Annual Crime Incidents/Total Exposed Population.
(1)
Where:
Total Exposed Population  (Residents)  (Employees)
 (Shoppers)  (Visitors). (2)
Time of the day in crime data is critical since the crime incidents that should be
included in the numerator are the ones committed during hours that the stores are
open, such as from 8:00AM to 8:00PM. Conceptually, crimes committed after
closing should not be part of the calculation since they do not affect shoppers and
other daytime workers and visitors. However, if an area has a high crime rate after
stores close, it might still create a negative safety image to shoppers even though
the crime rate during store hours is low. A shopper may be less likely to visit a
shopping center where several midnight murders are reported if he or she has
other alternative destinations.
The denominator—the total crime exposed population—may be somewhat over-
estimated due to the overlap among groups, illustrated in Exhibit 3. Residents mayCrime and Town Centers  587
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work in the same area. Residents may also represent part of the shoppers, as may
employees. Among the four groups, ‘‘visitors’’ is the only category that is, to a
large extent, independent of the other three groups. Taking into account the
overlaps between residents, employees and shoppers may increase the pool of the
risk-exposed population.
Identifying the extent of the overlaps is not practical due to the lack of
information. However, since denominators in both downtown and suburbs are
subject to similar overlaps, this study assumes that the potential errors in the Total
Exposed Population are on the same order of magnitude and therefore do not alter
the results.5
The Victimization rates are computed for two geographic areas in each city and
suburb. The larger area—called the Study Area—encompasses the entire
downtown core or suburban business district. The smaller area—called the Target
Area—encompasses the immediate shopping district where major shopping
destinations in the downtown or suburban town center are located. The Study
Areas and Target Areas in Los Angeles and Santa Monica are shown in Exhibits
4 and 5. The Study and Target Areas San Diego and Fashion Valley are shown in
Exhibit 6.6
Four comparisons were conducted based on the matrix shown in Exhibit 7 in
order to gain insight into victimization rates in the four locations. For each
comparison, the area that has a lower victimization rate is safer.
Comparison 1 contrasts the victimization rates between the Study Areas and Target
Areas for downtown Los Angeles and San Diego. Comparison 2 compares the
Study Areas and Target Areas for each of the two suburbs, Santa Monica and
Fashion Valley. These two comparisons provide insight into whether the shopping
district Target Areas have higher crime rates than the entire downtown Study Areas
in which they are situated.
Comparison 3 contrasts the victimization rates for the Target Areas between the
downtown and the suburb—Los Angeles Downtown versus Santa Monica, and
San Diego Downtown versus Fashion Valley. Comparison 4 contrasts the Study
Areas between the downtown and suburb for each metropolitan area. These two
comparisons go to the heart of the study, providing the answer for the question:
Are the downtown shopping areas and surrounding study areas more dangerous
than their suburban counterparts?
While the comparative crime rates in the shopping districts themselves are the
primary focus for bringing people back downtown, crime rates of the downtown
as a whole versus the suburb are also important. A shopping destination may be
considered safer than its suburban counterpart if it has a lower victimization rate.
However, if its surrounding area is not, the shopping destination may still suffer
from the negative image of its broader neighborhood context.588  Peiser and Xiong












Initially, six metropolitan areas around the country were examined. Los Angeles
and San Diego were chosen because data was more readily available and their
proximity and our familiarity with them made it easier to deﬁne the boundary
areas. The boundary areas were based on input from the police and planningCrime and Town Centers  589
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Exhibit 5  Santa Monica Target Area and Study Area In BEAT Map Format Overlaid with Census Tracts
departments in the four areas, and by the natural boundaries of the areas. The
western boundary of the Study Area in downtown Los Angeles coincides with the
boundary for the Target Area, for example, because the shopping district is on the
west side of downtown and extends to the Harbor Freeway. This freeway forms
a natural boundary both for the downtown core (the Study Area) and for the Target
Area (see Exhibit 4).
Similarly, the southern and western boundaries in downtown San Diego are co-
terminus for both the Study Area and the Target Area because the shopping district
is on the ocean (see Exhibit 6).
The Study Area for the Los Angeles downtown is the core central business district
encircled by freeways. This area, which is approximately 1.5 miles by 2 miles
includes not only the downtown ofﬁce, retail, government, and performing arts
cores, but also the old garment district and skid row. The Target Area is the newer
downtown shopping district. It contains the indoor and outdoor shopping malls of
Macy’s Plaza, 7th Street Market place and Arco Plaza. This area is the major590  Peiser and Xiong







































Downtown SD Study Area 
Downtown SD Target Area 
Fashion Valley Study Area 
Fashion Valley Target Area
shopping district catering to tourists, ofﬁce workers and suburban shoppers (see
Exhibit 4)7
Santa Monica is an independent municipality contiguous to Los Angeles
approximately 10 miles west of downtown on the Paciﬁc Ocean. While it has
many wealthy residents and is adjacent to some of the most expensive parts of
the city, it also has a sizeable renter, elderly and immigrant population. Third
Street Promenade in Santa Monica—a pedestrian street in the heart of the
shopping district—has become one of the most popular shopping destinations for
tourists as well as residents throughout west L.A.8
San Diego has seen one of the most successful revivals of downtown shopping in
the U.S. through the redevelopment of Horton Plaza and the Gas Lamp DistrictCrime and Town Centers  591
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Exhibit 7  Victimization Rate Comparisons
        (A)                   (B) 
Downtown   Suburb 
(1) Shopping Destinations        
  Target Area 
(2) CBD/Town Centers        
  Study Area 
 
Abbreviations: 
Target Areas:  LADTA—Los Angeles Downtown Target Area  
  S M D T A —Santa Monica Downtown Target Area 
  S D D T A —San Diego Downtown Target Area 
  S D F V T A —San Diego Fashion Valley Target Area 
Study Areas:  LADSA—Los Angeles Downtown Study Area 
  S M D S A —Santa Monica Downtown Study Area 
  S D D S A —San Diego Downtown Study Area 





































over the last twenty years. While it is a much more popular tourist destination
than downtown Los Angeles—in part because it is located next to the ocean—the
downtown shopping district must compete with numerous suburban shopping
centers. The Study Area is deﬁned by freeways and natural boundaries; the Target
Area, by police BEAT areas, which contain the shopping district around Horton
Plaza (Exhibit 6).9
San Diego’s Fashion Valley area contains the largest concentration of major
suburban shopping centers within the City of San Diego, approximately 8 miles
northwest of downtown at the conjunction of two major freeways. It is located in
an area that is traditionally the wealthier part of town. The police department’s
Western Division includes a very large area extending to the ocean. While the592  Peiser and Xiong
Target Area for Fashion Valley was clearly deﬁned by the immediate shopping
district, the entire area of the Western Division was initially included in the
analysis. Subsequently, a smaller area was deﬁned, which excluded the ‘Peninsula
area’ west of Paciﬁc Highway. While the Peninsula area is part of the Western
Division, it is cut off from the rest of the study area by Paciﬁc Highway.10
All four areas include major indoor shopping malls as well as street-oriented retail
shops. San Diego’s Horton Plaza and Santa Monica’s Third Street Promenade
provide open-air shopping experiences that are particularly attractive to tourists
and young people. While both downtown San Diego and Los Angeles have seen
extensive redevelopment over the last twenty years, San Diego has been more
successful at creating a downtown shopping environment that is likely to draw
residents from other parts of town.
Crime Data
The data for calculating victimization rates consists of two primary data sets: (1)
Part I crime data as the numerator; and (2) the number of residents, employees,
shoppers and visitors in the speciﬁed Study and Target Areas as the denominator.
For the numerator, Part I crime data collected from local police departments in
Los Angeles, Santa Monica and San Diego was used. The Part I crime data was
collected from local police departments by BEAT as of year-end 1997. Part I crime
data cover the entire spectrum of violent crimes that create the most signiﬁcant
safety concerns in an area (see the Appendix).
For example, crime data for both the Study and Target Areas in downtown Los
Angeles were obtained from the 1997 Los Angeles Police Department Selected
Crimes and Attempts Report, BEAT of Central Division. The Study Area covers
44 BEAT reporting units. The Target Area where major shopping malls are located
contains reporting units 151, 152, 161 and 162. The locations of the reporting
districts for these areas are shown in Exhibit 4. A similar procedure was used for
the other three geographic areas. These maps and detailed crime data tallies are
available from the authors.
Residents, Employees, Shoppers and Visitors
For the denominator, resident statistics were obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau. In each Study Area and Target Area, the total number of residents was
aggregated by census tracts that corresponded with the crime reporting districts.
Since census tract boundaries do not always conform to the crime data BEAT
boundaries, adjustments needed to be made for accuracy. The methodology used
in making adjustments assumes that population distributes evenly in each census
tract. As such, if a census tract is larger than the boundaries deﬁned by the crime
BEAT, the total number of residents is reduced by the percentage of area outside
the boundary. For example, the number of residents in 1990 for census tract 2100Crime and Town Centers  593
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in downtown Los Angeles is 5,552. However, since approximately 50% of the
census tract 2100 is located outside of the Target Area boundary, 50% of the
residents were included in the aggregation process.
In addition to the above adjustment, 1990 census data was converted to 1997
ﬁgures. In downtown Los Angeles and Santa Monica, a countywide average
growth rate of 5% over seven years was applied, using information from the
California Department of Finance, Demographic Research Unit. A countywide
growth rate of 11.9% was applied to downtown San Diego and the Fashion Valley
Area based on information from the San Diego Association of Governments.
The number of employees and shoppers for all four areas was taken from the
1997 Daily Trip Data provided by the Southern California Association of
Governments and the San Diego Association of Governments. The Trip Data
identiﬁes employees and shoppers whose travel destinations are inside the Target
and Study Areas. As such, employees are those traveling from various places to
‘‘work’’ while shoppers are estimated from the number of trips to ‘‘shop’’ in the
Target and Study Areas.
The number of overnight visitors in downtown Los Angeles and Santa Monica
was approximated by multiplying the total hotel room inventory by the 1997
annual hotel occupancy rates provided by the local Convention and Visitor Bureau
for each city. The study assumed 1.57 average occupancy per occupied room.11
Also, the number of overnight visitors was assumed to be the same for both the
Target Area and the Study Area on the grounds that hotels in the Study Area
generate the visitors who shop in the Target Area. Most downtown hotels are
located near the Target Area but not inside it. It seems reasonable to assume that
hotel guests in the downtown area are likely to shop in the main downtown
shopping area. Therefore, Study Area hotel guests were included in the
computation of the Total Exposed Population (Equation 2).
The Total Exposed Population thus includes everyone who lives, works, shops, or
visits the Study and Target Areas during the daytime. A breakdown of crimes by
time of day was not available for all the areas studied, so crime data includes
crimes committed during nighttime.12
Exhibit 7 shows the breakdown for residents, workers, shoppers and visitors, the
sum of which gives Total Daytime Population for downtown Los Angeles and
Santa Monica. Exhibit 8 shows the resident population and Total Daytime
Population for downtown San Diego and Fashion Valley.
Exhibits 9–11 summarize the crime incidents and victimization rates for the four
areas studied, broken down by type of crime. These tables provide results for
Comparisons 1 and 2, which contrast the Target Areas with the Study Areas for
each of the four geographic areas.
Exhibit 10 shows the crime counts and victimization rates for downtown Los
Angeles. The victimization rates in the Target Area are well below those of the594  Peiser and Xiong
Exhibit 8  Statistics of Daytime Population
Downtown Los Angeles and Santa Monica
Residents Workers Shoppers Visitors
Total Daytime
Population
LADTA 655 62,055 977 4,258 67,946
LADSA 24,672 217,070 8,693 4,258 254,693
SMDTA 2,457 36,878 1,660 3,725 44,720
SMDSA 20,806 55,618 4,840 3,725 84,988
Notes: Worker and shopper data are extracted from SCAG trip data. Resident data is obtained
from 1990 U.S. Census and California Department of Finance, Demographic Research Unit. The
1990 resident data is adjusted by a 5% growth rate from 1990 to 1997. (LA County population
growth rate is close to 5% from 1995 to 97: In 1997, the estimated population is 9,456,000; in
1990, it is 8,902,000).
Exhibit 9  Statistics of Daytime Population








Notes: Daytime population and resident data are provided by SANDAG. SANDAG daytime
population is calculated based on trip data. However, the data does not contain a breakdown of












































Exhibit 10  Downtown Los Angeles 1997 Daytime Part I Crime Victimization
Target Area vs. Study Area, by Type of Crime
Murder Rape Robbery
Agg.





Panel A: Crime Incidents
LADTA 2 82 41 137 189 29 425 37 125 817
LADSA 13 27 918 641 715 1,525 273 1,764 385 1,600 4,662
Panel B: Victimization
LADTA 0.00% 0.00% 0.12% 0.06% 0.20% 0.28% 0.04% 0.63% 0.05% 0.18% 1.20%
LADSA 0.00% 0.01% 0.36% 0.25% 0.28% 0.60% 0.11% 0.69% 0.15% 0.63% 1.83%
Note: Daytime population is used to calculate the victimization rate.596  Peiser and Xiong
Study Area, both for violent crime and for property crime (Comparison 1). This
conﬁrms what one would expect since the Study Area includes Skid Row east of
Main Street but the Target Area does not.13 Theft and burglary dominate the crime
categories.
Exhibit 11 shows the breakdown of crime for Santa Monica. A comparison of
victimization rates (Comparison 2) shows that the Target Area around Third Street
Promenade is somewhat more dangerous than the Study Area (the rest of Santa
Monica’s downtown). This is the case for all types of crime except residential
burglary and vehicle theft. Since the rest of downtown Santa Monica is a mixture
of low-to-mid-rise ofﬁce buildings, hospital buildings, minor retail, and moderate-
density residential buildings, and there is no area comparable to Skid Row in
downtown Los Angeles, it is not surprising that the Target Area has slightly higher
crime than the rest of downtown.
Exhibit 12 shows the results for downtown San Diego. The downtown Target Area
has about half the crimes of the Study Area. It has relatively higher theft,
commercial burglary, and robbery, and relatively lower crimes in the other
categories for murder, rape, aggravated assault and residential burglary. Like
downtown Los Angeles, downtown San Diego has a Skid Row area, although it
is smaller than Los Angeles’. Also, unlike Los Angeles, there are more high-
income residents who live downtown.
Victimization rates for the downtown San Diego Target Area around Horton Plaza
(Comparison 1) are similar to those of the Study Area. Rates are slightly lower
for violent crime in the Target Area, and slightly higher for property crime than
in the Study Area.
The breakdown of crime for San Diego’s Fashion Valley is shown in Exhibit 13.
For 1997, 131 violent crimes and 1,482 property crimes occurred in the Target
Area. The great majority of crimes are theft and vehicle theft. As the population
ﬁgures in Exhibit 9 show, both the Fashion Valley Target Area and Study Area
are predominantly residential in character. Because the Study Area is mostly
residential, it includes many more residential burglaries. Also, robbery and
aggravated assault are surprisingly high in the Study Area.
Exhibit 13 shows the comparative victimization rates (Comparison 2) for San
Diego’s suburban Fashion Valley Study and Target areas. Victimization rates for
violent crime are lower in the Target Area than the Study Area (0.59% vs. 1.05%)
but property crime victimization rates are higher in the Target Area (6.74% vs.
5.64%). The crime rate is surprisingly high in the Fashion Valley area—double
that of downtown.
Comparison of Downtown vs. Suburban Shopping
Districts
Exhibits 14 and 15 answer the question: Are downtowns more dangerous than












































Exhibit 11  Santa Monica Downtown 1997 Daytime Part I Crime Victimization














Panel A: Crime Incidents
SMDTA 7 86 60 5 92 1,319 94 3 153 1,513
SMDSA 14 126 122 68 144 1,853 224 4 262 2,293
Panel B: Victimization
SMDTA 0.00% 0.02% 0.19% 0.13% 0.01% 0.21% 2.95% 0.21% 0.01% 0.34% 3.38%
SMDSA 0.00% 0.02% 0.15% 0.14% 0.08% 0.17% 2.18% 0.26% 0.00% 0.31% 2.70%


















Exhibit 12  San Diego Downtown 1997 Daytime Part I Crime Victimization














Panel A: Crime Incidents
SDDTA 2 18 174 243 56 171 1,565 295 436 2,087
SDDSA 7 55 358 730 304 341 2,692 763 1,150 4,100
Panel B: Victimization
SDDTA 0.00% 0.02% 0.24% 0.34% 0.08% 0.24% 2.16% 0.41% 0.60% 2.89%
SDDSA 0.00% 0.03% 0.22% 0.46% 0.19% 0.21% 1.69% 0.48% 0.72% 2.58%












































Exhibit 13  San Diego Fashion Valley Area 1997 Daytime Part I Crime Victimization














Panel A: Crime Incidents
SDFVTA 1 4 45 81 36 77 942 428 131 1,482
SDFVSA 8 36 368 784 709 353 3,984 1,351 1,196 6,397
Panel B: Victimization
SDFVTA 0.00% 0.02% 0.20% 0.37% 0.16% 0.35% 4.28% 1.95% 0.59% 6.74%
SDFVSA 0.01% 0.03% 0.32% 0.69% 0.63% 0.31% 3.51% 1.19% 1.05% 5.64%
Note: Daytime population is used to calculate the victimization rate.600  Peiser and Xiong
Exhibit 14  1997 Victimization Comparison Between Downtown LA and Santa Monica
Downtown LA Santa Monica
Approach LADTA (%) LADSA (%) SMDTA (%) SMDSA (%)
Proposed 1.39 2.46 3.73 3.01
Conventional 143.77 25.38 67.81 12.28








Proposed 3.49 3.30 7.33 6.70
Conventional 15.75 6.09 10.17 7.43
and 4. These exhibits also show the conventional calculation of victimization rates
based solely on residential population.
Exhibit 14 compares the victimization rates for downtown Los Angeles and Santa
Monica. The conventional computation indicates that downtown Los Angeles is
much more dangerous than suburban Santa Monica—143.77% versus 67.81% in
the Target Areas, and 25.38% versus 12.28% in the Study Areas. The proposed
computation, however, shows just the reverse—that downtown Los Angeles is
safer than Santa Monica. Both the downtown Los Angeles Target and Study Areas
have lower victimization rates than Santa Monica—1.39% versus 3.73% for the
Target Areas (Comparison 3); 2.46% versus 3.01% for the Study Areas
(Comparison 4). The proposed victimization rates offer a much better estimate of
one’s likelihood of being a crime victim during the daytime than the conventional
computation.
While the daytime victimization rate for Santa Monica is more than double that
of downtown Los Angeles in the Target Area, the conventional rate does provide
an approximation of the nighttime victimization rate. Indeed, that rate is much
higher in downtown Los Angeles than Santa Monica, both in the Target and Study
Areas. The conventional victimization rate of 144% suggests that each resident
will be victimized, on average, 1.5 times per year—a frightening possibility. The
rate is so much higher in the Target Area because there are so few residents there.Crime and Town Centers  601
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No doubt, these high rates are likely to impact consumers’ perceptions of the
general safety in downtown. Nevertheless, the results indicate that such ﬁgures do
not properly reﬂect the victimization risk to shoppers during daytime. It should
be noted that as shopping centers cater more successfully to nighttime customers
through restaurants and cinemas, shopping center owners have a stake in more
careful accounting about the time and location of crime.
Exhibit 15 shows that the difference between the proposed computation and the
conventional computation for San Diego is even more dramatic. The conventional
rate suggests that the downtown San Diego Target Area is more dangerous than
Fashion Valley—15.75% versus 10.17%. In fact, the proposed computation
indicates that the victimization rate in the downtown Target Area is less than half
the rate in the suburban Fashion Valley Target Area—3.49% versus 7.33%. The
difference, of course, is due to the fact that the conventional rate is based on a
very small nighttime population whereas the proposed victimization rate is based
on the far larger daytime population.
Conventional rates suggest that the downtown Study Area is much safer than the
downtown Target Area (6.09% versus 15.75%) because the Study Area boundaries
include several residential neighborhoods around downtown. The proposed
computation shows that the downtown Study and Target Areas have similar
victimization rates (3.30% versus 3.49%).
For the Study Areas, conventional rates show that downtown San Diego is
somewhat safer than Fashion Valley—6.09% versus 7.43%. The proposed
computation for the Study Areas, however, shows that victimization rate for
downtown compared to Fashion Valley is signiﬁcantly lower than the conventional
rate suggests—3.30% versus 6.70%.
A comparison of Los Angeles with San Diego reveals that crime rates in San
Diego are higher than Los Angeles both in downtown and in the selected suburb.
The crime rate for Fashion Valley was in fact so high that the analyses were
questioned and rerun. One possible explanation for the surprisingly high
victimization rate in Fashion Valley is that it is close to areas that are crowded
and have signiﬁcant poverty and deteriorated housing. While this is also true of
Santa Monica, the size and proximity of such neighborhoods to Fashion Valley
may have greater impact on the comparisons. Fashion Valley was selected in the
ﬁrst place based on recommendations by the San Diego Police Department and
real estate developers familiar with the San Diego area who indicated that Fashion
Valley was the dominant suburban shopping district. Nevertheless, Fashion Valley
clearly is not located in as exclusive an area as that surrounding Santa Monica.14
 Conclusion
Downtown shopping districts have been in decline since the 1950s when suburban
shopping centers ﬁrst started attracting shoppers away from them. Eventually, the
department stores where they shopped moved away as well. Since then, downtown602  Peiser and Xiong
landscapes have been littered by countless attempts—mostly unsuccessful—to
bring shoppers back downtown. While many factors have contributed to the
declining role of downtown shopping districts, this paper has focused on crime,
and whether or not reported crime rates properly reﬂect one’s likelihood of being
a crime victim.
One of the principal impediments to the revival of downtown shopping districts
is the perception that the areas have high crime rates and therefore are more
dangerous than their suburban counterparts. This study has examined the crime
data for two cities, Los Angeles and San Diego, in an attempt to see if the
perceptions of high crime rates downtown are still justiﬁed. Changing the
perceptions about crime are important for changing consumer attitudes about the
attractiveness of alternative shopping destinations, and therefore to tenants and
investors.
Crime data is typically reported in terms of crimes per 100,000 residents. Such
data is misleading for commercial shopping cores since the residential populations
are small. This is especially true of downtown shopping cores that have even fewer
residents than their suburban counterparts. Victimization rates are intended to
report the likelihood that one will be a victim of a crime in a given area. The
error embedded in computing victimization rates based on residents was corrected
in a business district by measuring the daytime populations, which include not
only residents but also workers, shoppers and out-of-town visitors. Conceptually,
one’s likelihood of being a crime victim depends on the number of people in a
given location at a given time. While the data is messy, the resulting numbers
give a better measure of a person’s being a crime victim in the subject areas.
The results for both downtown Los Angeles and downtown Santa Monica indicate
that daytime victimization rates are higher in the suburban shopping district than
in downtown. The same results hold for downtown San Diego versus suburban
Fashion Valley. In every case, the crime rates are lower downtown than in the
suburban comparison area, both for the Target Areas and the Study Areas. Careful
tabulation of crime and population for Los Angeles and San Diego support the
notion that at least these two downtowns are in fact safer than people think. Similar
research conducted in other cities may add support to these results. In any event,
to the extent that fear of crime has deterred investment in downtown areas, changes
would appear to be occurring that make downtown areas safer and therefore more
attractive for investment.
 Appendix
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Data Source: Los Angeles Police Department, Santa Monica Police Department
and San Diego Police Department.
 Endnotes
1 One of the reviewers provided this succinct description for the purpose of the paper.
2 This discussion presumes that crime rates in the wealthiest parts of town are as low or
lower than other areas that are not as well-off. While criminals certainly are drawn to
wealthier parts of town, residents of those areas typically have the political power to
obtain the best police protection. They also can afford private security services as
evidenced by the large number of homes in Santa Monica with yard signs indicating
that the homes are guarded by private security patrols.
3 The victimization rate may have different deﬁnitions in other literatures.
4 The deﬁnition of Part I crime may vary between police departments. See the Data
section.
5 Since residents and employees are population groups that present themselves in an area
on a daily basis while shoppers and visitors present themselves at much lower
frequencies, the victimization rate calculated through Equation (1) may underestimate
the actual risk exposure of these two groups. However, since this issue is consistent
between downtown and suburbs, both rates are assumed to be scaled down by the same
factor, therefore, this issue does not challenge the accuracy of the comparison.
6 More detailed maps for downtown San Diego and Fashion Valley are available from the
authors.
7 Another shopping district is located on the eastern side of downtown along Broadway.
It includes the old movie theaters, mostly defunct, and is now a popular Latino shopping
destination.
8 One of the reviewers questioned the choice of Santa Monica because it had its own pre-
existing downtown before the mall was built. While the selection of a ‘‘greenﬁelds’’
mall in Los Angeles for comparison may have led to different results, the Santa Monica
mall is one of the most popular shopping destinations and clearly represents a prime
shopping alternative to downtown. (Also see Endnote 13.)
9 BEAT is not an abbreviation but rather police lingo for a police patrol area or district.604  Peiser and Xiong
10 The authors were least familiar with the suburban shopping area of San Diego and relied
primarily on advice from the San Diego Police Department for determining the
boundaries of the Fashion Valley Target and Study Areas.
11 The fast assistance of Doug Geoga and Penny Pritzker is gratefully acknowledged.
12 The inclusion of nighttime crime is likely to make victimization rates in the Study Areas
somewhat higher relative to the Target Areas than they would otherwise be since the
Study Areas include some blocks with concentrations of poverty and homelessness that
the Target Areas do not. Nighttime crimes in these blocks are especially high.
13 Both the downtown Los Angeles and San Diego Study Areas include Skid Row areas
with larger concentrations of homeless and single room occupancy hotels. In both cities,
these areas are several blocks away from the Target Area, but their proximity inﬂuences
perceptions of higher crime in the Target Area.
14 Santa Monica has lower income neighborhoods close to the Study Area in Venice and
along Lincoln Avenue. One of the reviewers expressed concern about the selection of
Fashion Valley since it was not in an independent suburb like Santa Monica. In terms
of distance from the downtown shopping core and location in the wealthier part of town,
it is comparable to Santa Monica. Fashion Valley was selected through an unbiased
process. We concur with the reviewer that selection of another suburban shopping center
such as one in La Jolla, might have presented a less dramatic case in favor of downtown.
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